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Abstract 
We analyse the effect of geographic competition between schools on academic performance 
in Chile. The analysis controls for prior pupil performance, and a range of school and 
municipality characteristics. We allow for the endogeneity of voucher school location, using 
the number of local Catholic churches as an instrument. We find that a larger number of 
public schools positively affects the quality of education of other schools located in the same 
area, particularly amongst middle-class families and in middle-ranking schools. However, 
the number of voucher schools is associated with lower performance in neighbouring 
schools, which we attribute to pupil sorting.  
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Introduction 
 
What effect does providing more competition have on schools’ performance? This 
paper aims to answer this question in the context of Chile, a country where a wide-ranging 
voucher school programme was put in place in order to provide such competition. The 
analysis uses data on a large sample of Chilean schools to investigate this issue, 
distinguishing between competition from voucher schools and from other public schools, 
controlling for a large number of school and municipality-level variables that could also 
influence school performance, as well as for the prior performance of the pupils. We also 
allow for the potential endogeneity of school location choices. 
Reforms based on competition, decentralisation and privatisation of the educational 
market have been advocated as potentially generating the right incentives for an efficient 
educational system, where schools are more reactive to the needs and preferences of parents, 
as opposed to a standardised and monopolistic pure public educational system (Friedman, 
1962). The arguments in favour include that privatised schools are more efficient in meeting 
the consumers’ (i.e. parents’ and pupils’) demands, that people enjoy the freedom to choose, 
and that they produce a better match between pupil and school according to different 
preferences and needs (Lubienski, et al., 2009). Furthermore, the fact that parents can express 
their dissatisfaction directly by enrolling their children into another school, compared to the 
nationalised system where parents can only express their views using political channels, 
provides schools with the incentive to try to improve their pupils’ outcomes. Therefore, a 
system that includes private and public schools would provide a useful variety of schools and 
introduce flexibility and competition into the system (Friedman, 1962). 
In contrast, one of the main points made by supporters of the nationalisation of 
schools is that it is not possible to build a stable and democratic society without a minimum 
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level of education for the majority of individuals and without wide agreement about some 
common values. In addition, concerns about the increasing levels of social segregation could 
be raised as the number of private educational institutions increase, if better-resourced 
families are the ones with access to the private schools. A lack of information available to 
parents can weaken the competition between schools, which can in turn also increase 
segregation if those parents who lack information are poorer or less well-educated. 
Competition could thus potentially create more inequality among schools and children, 
concentrating poorer or less well-supported children into fewer schools. It has been claimed 
that the educational system could be one of the main institutional causes of a low 
intergenerational mobility in society (Breen, 2001). On the other hand, segregation could still 
incur in the absence of a private sector or vouchers, if school places are allocated on the basis 
of proximity to schools, and thus a school’s roll call reflects the socio-economic 
characteristics of the area in which it is located.  
This paper therefore provides some empirical evidence on the particular issue of 
whether competition between schools raises pupil outcomes, also considering whether any 
such effects differ between private and state schools. While the answers obtained are, strictly 
speaking, applicable only to the case of Chile, they are still informative as to the potential 
effects of reforms in other countries. The analysis defines the competition faced by a school 
in terms of the number of other schools in a circle of given radius around the first school, 
checking the robustness of the results to changes in the radius, and to consideration of the 
quality rather than the quantity of competitor schools. The results show that competition from 
public schools increases pupil performance in both other public schools and in voucher 
schools. Competition from voucher schools, however, is found to be associated with lower 
performance in both types of schools. 
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Our study makes a number of key contributions to the literature. First, we take 
account of the potentially endogenous location of the new voucher schools, using an 
instrumental variable based on the existence of local catholic churches, since many voucher 
schools have ties to organised religion. This is the key methodological contribution of the 
paper. In addition, we go further than simply looking at average effects, by also using 
quantile regression techniques to understand distributional effects, in particular where in the 
distribution of school quality the competition effects are most closely felt. We also break the 
results down by socio-economic background, again to determine how the competition effects 
vary across the distribution of family background. These results allow us to make some 
inferences about sorting as well as efficiency effects, the final contribution of our paper. 
The next section outlines the Chilean Educational System, to be analysed in the 
empirical section. Section 3 summarises previous relevant literature, followed by a section 
that describes the methodology and data to be used. Section 5 describes the results of the 
analysis, while a final section concludes. 
 
 
2. Chilean educational system 
 
In Chile, the need to increase the provision of education, increase the efficiency of the 
public sector and increase the quality of the educational service provision was planned 
through reforms regarding school choice, in particular, by opening the supply-side provision 
to non-governmental institutions and reducing the barriers to entry for organisations that can 
focus on pupils with different preferences and needs. Thus, from 1981, and in the context of a 
market-oriented transformation of the country, Chile’s military non-democratic government 
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decentralised public schools and started financing some private schools with a voucher 
system for each pupil.  
In practical terms, the reform implied that public and voucher schools receive the 
same voucher amount which is unrestrictive so every pupil can participate. A voucher is a 
coupon that a pupil carries with them to the school they choose to attend. When the pupil 
enrols, the school receives the cash value of the voucher. Voucher schools only receive pupils 
that want to make use of the voucher; they do not accept pupils where parents want to pay the 
full extent of their education (these parents send their children to private, fee-paying schools). 
The main hope for the reform was that competition would create greater quality with 
fewer resources. Therefore, spending on education fell in the decade following the reform (in 
1990 spending on education was 23% lower than in 1982), with the deepest fall for secondary 
schools. Chile then became, “a virtual laboratory for a relatively unregulated, decentralised, 
competitive market in primary and secondary education” (Bravo, et al., 2010, p. 2). 
One of the immediate effects of the reform was that more than a thousand new 
voucher schools were opened within the first five years. In 1980 there were 1,627 voucher 
schools, but by 1985 there were 2,643 such schools (Hsieh and Urquila, 2006). This 
expansion of the supply side was followed by a large increase in the number of pupils 
receiving a formal education and an increase in demand for privately administered schools.  
For example, only 50% of children in the relevant age group were attending secondary school 
in 1990, but in 2006, 70% were attending (Ministry of Education, 2008)  
Even though these improvements in educational coverage were observed, it has been 
suggested that it was the decrease in public spending on education which created the 
incentive to open new voucher schools (Checchi and Jappelli, 2003). In particular, public 
schools had fewer resources, generating a decline in the service provided (though if 
competition was effective and increased efficiency, this effect could be cancelled out). A 
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further decline in public school performance could be observed due to sorting effects, given 
that voucher schools can select their pupils, thereby leaving the pupils who have the most 
difficulties to go to the public schools. Even though parents have the freedom to choose the 
school that they want without restrictions of area of residence, the pupil selection process can 
be based upon academic tests, parental interviews, or religious affiliation, so the voucher 
schools can secure for themselves the better pupils. In contrast, public schools accept all 
applicants if the total number remains below their maximum provision, and can only use 
selection criteria, such as parental interviews and academic tests, when faced with an over-
demand. The implications of the reform are therefore diverse, and cannot be predicted with 
certainty a priori. 
 Given the criticisms of the implementation of the neoliberal educational reform 
mentioned, some elements were reversed by the government in the return to democracy in 
1990 (OECD, 2004). However, the voucher school system has remained, even during 
successive changes implemented by the subsequent democratic governments. In 1994, 
voucher schools were allowed to charge pupil tuition fees on top of the voucher obtained by 
the pupili, a policy which may further increase any segregation by income levels across 
schools (Narodowski and Nores, 2002). In 1995, with an already stable democracy 
established in the country, the government’s increase in spending on education became the 
priority in terms of social policy. From 1996 the ‘Full Day School’ reform was implemented 
together with a curriculum reform, to support the poorest schools, and a programme to 
increase quality and equity in education was provided. Finally, in 2008, an increase of 50% in 
the value of the voucher per pupil classified as vulnerable by the Ministry of Development 
and Planning was established. 
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3. Previous literature 
 
Literature on school competition and educational outcomes is relatively scarce and 
also largely inconclusive. Often the biggest limitation is a lack of appropriate data. Many of 
the previous studies have thus either been theoretical, or have focussed upon experiments in 
the USA (Hoxby, 2003). Estimates of competition effects in other countries exist for Sweden, 
where independent schools cannot select pupils by ability or family background (Böhlmark 
and Lindahl, 2008 and Lindbom, 2010) and New Zealand (Ladd and Fiske, 2003), and in 
analyses of the effect of competition in mainly publicly-administered educational systems 
such as the UK (Bradley and Taylor, 2002, and Gibbons et al., 2006). Additionally, some 
examples exist from developing countries, such as Bangladesh where vouchers are supplied 
only to females attending grades 6-10, in Guatemala where vouchers are supplied only to 
selected girls between the ages of 7-14 from low income families (West, 1996) and India, 
where voucher school allocation was done via lottery (Muralidharan and Sundararaman, 
2015). 
Existing results regarding the effect on school performance due to competition are 
diverse. Arum (1996) points out that in the US the proportion of private subsidised schools in 
an area has an important positive influence on the performance of public schools, as theory 
predicts. However, the improvement does not seem to be related to an increase in efficiency 
through competition, but rather because of an increase in the resources provided to public 
schools. In addition, Hoxby (2003) uses data from American school choice programmes to 
find that pupil achievement improves when they attend voucher schools and that public 
schools respond positively to competition. On the other hand, Gibbons et al. (2006) in the 
case of London’s primary schools, analyse the effect of increasing school choice and 
increasing school competition separately, finding no significant evidence to suggest that 
8 
 
geospatial competition affects performance positively. The most likely reason behind the 
inconclusive finding is the large variety of types of voucher systems implemented around the 
world.  
Chile is a good source of empirical evidence, as a simultaneous voucher and 
privatisation system has been implemented nationwide for more than 30 years in the country 
with very distinctive characteristics (i.e. in contrast to most of the voucher systems 
introduced in other countries, positive selection was allowed). This was supposed to produce 
an increase in competition and therefore, an increase in educational quality in the 
municipalities that had a larger proportion of private institutions (Ladd and Fiske, 2003). It is 
considered that location and quality of school play an important role in school choice in Chile 
(Gallego and Hernando, 2009). Patrinos and Sakellariou (2008) point out that overall, the 
reforms improved the efficiency of the educational system, but that benefits were achieved at 
the expense of equity. The study by Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) is most similar to ours, in that 
they investigate how the differences in change in school performance at the regional level are 
related to the differences in the growth of private voucher schools across regions. They find 
that in Chile, competition from voucher schools does not seem to improve pupil performance 
and point out the importance of distinguishing between the effects of school productivity and 
school sorting. Our study differs from theirs in that we investigate the relationship at the 
school level, and also allow for the endogeneity of voucher school location. 
Endogeneity of competition effects has been one of the main concerns in the 
competition-effect literature. Voucher schools may prefer to settle in areas with 
characteristics favourable to higher existing pupil performance, such as good socio-economic 
background (omitted variable issues) or voucher schools may deliberately set up in areas with 
low-quality existing public education (reverse causality).To rule out these concerns, Hoxby 
(1994) analysed the effect of school choice in the USA on improving the quality of education 
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provided using as an instrument for voucher school enrolment the percentage of Catholic 
people in the area, finding that voucher school competition improves public school 
performance. A related instrument is used in this study, namely the number of Catholic 
churches in the local area. 
The research presented here is motivated by the desire to contribute with evidence to 
the study of the effect of competition and market-oriented educational provision on the 
academic performance of schools, treating the latter as an indicator of the quality of 
education that schools provide. The results are important if one considers that the Chilean 
educational system seems to be in crisis, reflected, among other things, by a permanent 
underperforming in international educational tests (Medrano and Contreras, 2009)ii and by a 
highly segregated educational system (Manzi et al, 2008) and also considering that the 
arguments against voucher systems are often more ideological than supported by empirical 
evidence (Arenas, 2004).  
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
To study the effects of school competition on academic performance, information on 
academic assessment of pupils is used to measure the performance of schools, namely the 
SIMCE (System of Measurement of Quality of Education) data sets, provided by the Chilean 
Ministry of Education since 1990. These data sets contain information on academic tests in 
mathematics, reading/writing (Spanish), natural sciences and historyiii, which are taken every 
year in every urban school in Chile, regardless of the school’s type of funding.iv Here we 
make use of each school’s average score in the mathematics and Spanish academic 
assessments. 
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Each year, SIMCE surveys a different year group within schools, alternating between 
fourth grade and eighth grade in primary schools and second grade in secondary schools. 
Two years of data were specifically chosen to be analysed, namely 2005 and 2009. In 2005, 
pupils were evaluated in their 4th primary grade, while the 2009 survey focused on 8th 
primary grade. Thus, the pupils surveyed within each school in these two years were, with the 
exception of a small number of school-movers, the same children. Using these two years 
therefore allows us to look at changes over time in test scores (so-called ‘value added’ 
specifications), or equivalently to control for the starting test scores of the pupils, and so 
control for the quality of each school’s intake.  
The other key variable to define is the level of competition faced by each school. This 
is measured as the number of other schools in a fixed geographic radius around each school. 
We use information on geographical coordinates for each school in the country to measure 
distances between them, using the Universal Transverse Mercator (UTM) of two dimensional 
Cartesian coordinates to represent the surface of the Earth. 
A range of other explanatory variables, from a variety of sources, are used in the 
estimated equation to control for other determinants of pupil performance. These include 
average characteristics of the pupils in each school, other school level characteristics 
including type of school, and characteristics of the municipalities in which schools are 
located. These data were obtained from a range of sources, as described in Table A1 in 
Appendix A, with descriptive statistics provided in Table B1 in Appendix B. 
The sample obtained, when combining the various data sources mentioned above, 
contains a similar proportion of public schools (55%, or 2,450 schools) and voucher schools 
(45%, or 2,007 schools), of which one-third are totally free voucher schools and two-thirds 
are voucher schools charging tuition fees. Out of a total number of 346 municipalities, 330 
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are included in the analysis. Of the included municipalities, 238 have at least one voucher 
school. 
The impact of competition between schools on school quality is estimated using the 
model below, as suggested by Gibbons et al. (2006): 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 =  𝛼𝑦𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝜃𝑃𝐶𝐼_𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 +  𝜃𝑉𝐶𝐼_𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 + 𝜎𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜀𝑠𝑡 
 
𝑦𝑠𝑡 corresponds to the average academic performance of children in school s in year t 
(2009).v 𝑦𝑠𝑡−1  is the average performance of the same children in an earlier year (2005) in 
the same school s. 𝐶𝐼_𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 corresponds to the competition index of school s in year t 
from public schools. The index 𝐶𝐼_𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑡 is the number of public schools that are in a 
straight line distance of less than 3 km from the school analysedvi. In a similar way, 
𝐶𝐼_𝑉𝑜𝑢𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑡 represents the competition index of the school s in year t from voucher 
schools. 𝑋𝑠𝑡 is a vector of pupil, school and neighbourhood characteristics and 𝜀𝑠𝑡 is the error 
term. 
Separate variables measuring the number of public schools and the number of 
vouchers schools within 3km are therefore included in the estimated equation. We have no a 
priori prediction about the relative size of the competition effect from each type of school, 
and so do not impose any restriction that they should have equal coefficients by including a 
single variable measuring the total number of schools.  
The competition indices are applied only to primary schools in urban areas. Only 
primary schools are considered since children often move between schools when they pass to 
secondary education, so that past performance of the same children in each school could not 
be controlled for if the second grade in secondary school data were used (many primary 
schools do not allow for the possibility of continuing secondary studies at the same 
institution). 
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We undertake a number of checks to determine the robustness of the results to 
changes in the definition of these competition variables. For example, competition indices 
could undesirably capture the effect of urban density and school size effects (Gibbons, et al., 
2006). Therefore, per capita competition indices were also calculated, dividing the raw 
competition indices above by the number of people living in the municipality where the 
school s is located. 
Since the choice of 3km distance was chosen somewhat arbitrarily (as the average 
distance travelled to school), alternative distances were also used, namely 2km and 4km, to 
check the robustness of the results to this choice. A final variation considered competition in 
terms of the quality of other schools, rather than the quantity. The quality of competition was 
measured as the average test performance of public schools located less than 3km from 
school s, and the average test performance of voucher schools located less than 3km from 
school s, as suggested by Bradley, et al. (1999).  
Another potential issue here is that Chile has a programme of teacher pay premiums 
(SNED) based on 4th and 8th grade SIMCE scores by school (Mizala and Romaguera, 2002). 
As argued by Carnoy et al. (2007), it is easier to achieve gains in scores in the 4th grade than 
in the 8th grade, so that if schools are trying to increase the probability that they win a pay 
premium, then they might move their best teachers into the 4th grade in test years. If schools 
facing more competition are more likely to do this, then this could cause a downward effect 
of competition on 8th grade scores, conditional on 4th grade scores, which could be a partial 
explanation for some of our results that follow. We therefore estimated a further OLS 
specification, where we add to the list control variables, two variables measuring the whether 
the individual school was selected for a SNED premium in 2005, and the proportion of 
primary schools in school s’s municipality to be selected to receive such a premium.vii 
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As well as the specification of the equation in terms of included variables, we also 
check the robustness of the results to the econometric methodology used. Most importantly, 
competition from voucher schools is likely to be an endogenous variable. One possible 
argument is that more schools could be established in a particular area because, for example, 
better performing pupils are located there, so that the academic performance in school s and 
the competition index (number of other schools in the area) would both be a function of other 
variables that influence pupil performance, such as the socio-economic background of the 
area. This will be controlled for as far as possible through the municipality characteristic 
variables. However, to the extent that some characteristics that determine the degree of 
competition and pupil performance are unobserved, then this would cause a correlation 
between the competition variable and the error term and OLS estimation would be biased and 
inconsistent. Alternatively, the number of voucher schools could be endogenous to public 
school quality (i.e. more voucher schools set up where public schools suffer from a bad 
reputation, precisely because of the poor choice of available public schools).  
 We continue to treat the public school competition index as exogenous throughout. 
Public schools do not have to make the same location choices, choosing between alternative 
areas on the basis of the most beneficial site for the school owners. In addition, few new 
public schools are opened, and the closure of public schools does not occur. The location and 
hence the number of public schools in a given area can therefore be treated as exogenous to 
other schools in the period in question. 
The solution to the problem of voucher school competition endogeneity is to use an 
instrumental variable approach. The instrument we use is the number of Catholic churches by 
municipality. The argument is that the more churches there are in a municipality, then the 
more voucher schools are likely to be created there on average, since a significant percentage 
of voucher schools are officially Catholic and many others are at least named after Catholic 
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saints.viii More churches aid the creation of schools by offering buildings to share and 
providing more available teachers (nuns and priests). However, the number of churches 
should have no effect on school performance, other than through its effect on the number of 
voucher schools. In particular, the church variable is measured at the municipality level and 
so does not directly influence individual particular schools. 
It could possibly be argued that the number of Catholic churches in a municipality is 
itself a function of the characteristics of the local population. However, we argue that the 
number of churches is exogenously determined, by historical factors rather than current 
population characteristics, and thus is a valid instrument. Chilean churches were all built 
some time ago, in colonial times (before 1818) or during independence, but before 1950ix. 
From 1492 to the early 19th century Chile was part of the Spanish Empire. During this period, 
many churches were built on the basis of a large rural population, around which towns then 
developed. After Independence, a further wave of churches were built between 1928 and 
1940, due to the rising number of clergy during this period, as young men from middle or low 
social classes were encouraged to become priests (Checa-Artasu, 2015). Since this period, 
however, the Catholic Church in Chile has not built new churches, but only refurbished ones 
damaged by fire or earthquakes. In some cases it has built chapels when a community asked 
for onex. Therefore unlike churches, chapels continue to be built, and according to 
characteristics of the local population. Chapels were therefore not included in the 
instrumental variable used here; only main churches (parishes) were included. 
  The church variable was created using information posted on-line by Catholic 
archbishoprics on their respective web sites. It was not possible to acquire information for all 
municipalities, due to no information on church location or inexistent records available to the 
general public or researchers. Therefore, there are only 212 municipalities that have 
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information related to the number of Catholic churches (approximately two-thirds of the total 
number of 330 municipalities).  
An alternative to an IV methodology to control for endogenous voucher school 
location is a Fixed Effects framework. To the extent that voucher school location reflects 
characteristics of the local area not controlled for in our analysis, and if those characteristics 
remain constant between the years considered here, then including fixed effects for local 
areas will remove any bias on the competition coefficients due to this unobservable area 
heterogeneity. It was not possible to include fixed effects at the municipality level, because 
there is a lack of variation in the competition variable within municipalities. Within a 
municipality, each school will be competing with the other schools in the municipality, so 
that the competition indices will be the same (or at least very similar, depending on exact 
distances) for each school within the municipality. We therefore added area fixed effects at a 
higher level of aggregation, at the regional level. For this reason, this is not our preferred 
methodology, but if it is shown to produce similar results to those obtained through IV, then 
it will increase confidence in those results. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
In terms of average academic performance, voucher schools perform better than 
public schools, with average test scores of 238 in public schools, 241 in free voucher schools, 
and 264 in fee-paying voucher schools. Looking at changes in performance (value-added), 
the percentage of schools that improved their average academic performance between 2005 
and 2009 is higher among free voucher schools (64%) and very similar between public 
schools and private voucher schools (49% and 50% respectively).xi 
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The descriptive statistics in Table B1 show that the mean school level performance in 
Mathematics and Language, averaged across all schools, is very similar in 2005 and 2009 
(245 in 2005 and 246 in 2009). This does not mean, however, that there is little variation in 
individual’s schools performance over time to be explained, only that the positive and 
negative changes observed over time in individual schools tend to average out across all 
schools. As Figure 1 shows, there is significant variation around any 45 degree line of 
equality between 2005 and 2009 individual school level scores 
Turning to the competition variables, these vary depending on the type of school 
analysed. Schools face competition from an average of 2.7 public schools within a 3 km 
radius, and from an average of 9.1 voucher schools. Schools face more competition from 
voucher schools that charge tuition fees (7.3), as expected since free voucher schools are 
usually run by charitable institutions, and so are unlikely to cluster in areas where provision is 
already available.   
 
5.2 OLS estimates of the competition effect 
<Table 1 around here> 
 Table 1 reports the results from different OLS specifications, investigating the 
performance-competition relationship. The results for the base specification in column a 
suggest that each additional public school in the area (within 3 km) improves a school’s 
academic performance by 1.6 points, while the effect of voucher schools in the area decreases 
the average performance of neighbouring schools by 0.8 points. Both effects appear small 
considering that average academic performance in schools varies from 175 to 334 points with 
a standard deviation of 24 points. However, the effect is economically meaningful given that 
previous academic performance results (year 2005) are controlled for. Thus, each additional 
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competing public school is associated with 1.6 points greater improvement in scores in school 
s between 2005 and 2009, relative to a school with the same initial score in 2005. 
 The effect of competition may depend on the ease of travel, since a competing school 
is only a realistic competitor if it is accessible. Therefore, the competition variables were 
interacted with a variable measuring the perception of being close to the public transportation 
system. A higher value to this variable represents having better access to public 
transportation. However, contrary to what was expected, the effect of such access is to reduce 
the effect of competition from public schools by -0.018 test score points per transport 
perception point, while the effect from voucher schools increases by 0.008 test score points 
per transport perception point. Therefore, the effect of competition on school performance 
tends towards zero in either case, as the perception of good access to public transport 
increases. One possible reason for this effect could be a decrease in the quality of the 
transport service as it expands, since the question concerns access to transport, rather than the 
quality of that transport.xii  
The remaining columns of Table 1 estimate the alternative specifications outlined in 
the previous section, to determine the robustness of the results to such changes. Column b 
measures competition as the quality of surrounding schools, rather than quantity. The results 
show, however, that the effect of this competition variable is highly statistically insignificant, 
in the case of both public and voucher schools. It therefore seems that if schools respond to 
surrounding other schools, it is the number of them that they respond to, rather the results 
obtained by them. 
 Column c include interactions between the competition variables and the type of 
school being considered, to determine whether competition from different types of school 
affects public and voucher schools differently. The results show that public school 
competition has a positive impact on the performance of both public and voucher schools, but 
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significantly larger for voucher schools. The coefficient on the interaction with the voucher 
school competition variable is extremely small and statistically insignificant, suggesting no 
difference in the effect of competition from voucher schools on schools of different types.  
In columns d and e, the level of competition within 2 km and 4 km radii is considered, 
to determine the robustness of the results to the choice of distance within which to measure 
competition. The results show that the absolute size of the competition effects declines, the 
wider the area around the school in which the competition variable is measured. It therefore 
appears that the strength of the competition effect depends on the proximity of the schools 
being considered. 
Finally in column f, variables for the receipt of a SNED premium at the school level 
and the proportion in receipt at the municipality level are added. Comparing the results to 
those in column a, it can be seen that this makes no difference at all to the estimated 
coefficients on the competition variables.xiii 
 
5.3 Allowing for endogeneity of voucher school competition  
<Table 2 around here> 
 Table 2 presents the results when we allow for the potential endogeneity of 
competition from voucher schools, using IV and Fixed Effects estimators, as discussed in the 
Methodology section above. Column a presents the IV results, treating competition from 
voucher schools as endogenous and instrumented by the number of Catholic churches in the 
region. The first stage of the estimationxiv shows that the number of Catholic churches is a 
good instrument for the number of voucher schools, revealing a positive and significant 
relationship between the two variables. Using the rule of thumb of having a joint significance 
(F-test) in the first stage above 10, it is possible to suggest that it is a good instrumentxv.  
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The second stage IV estimation includes bootstrapped standard errors, because of the 
use of the predicted voucher competition index.xvi The results in column a show that the 
statistically significant negative coefficient on the voucher school competition variable 
remains, and indeed is larger in absolute value compared to the OLS specification in Table 1. 
Having ruled out reverse causality and endogenous variation in the extent of voucher school 
competition, through the use of IV, it therefore still seems to be the case that a random, 
exogenous increase in the number of voucher schools is negatively related to performance in 
other local schools. The positive and statistically significant effect of competition from other 
public schools also still remains, after the quantity of voucher school is instrumented.  
Column b introduces interaction terms between the competition variables and the type 
of school being considered. The coefficients on both of these interaction variables are small 
and highly insignificant. There is therefore no difference between public and voucher schools 
in how they react to competition from other schools – in both types of school, performance 
goes up in response to more competition from public schools, and down in response to more 
competition from voucher schools.  
Column c adopts an alternative method of controlling for any unobserved 
heterogeneity of local areas that might have influenced location of voucher schools, with the 
introduction of region fixed effects. The resulting coefficients for the competition variables 
are very similar to those estimated without Fixed Effects as observed in column a of Table 1. 
Similarly there is little difference in results between OLS and Fixed Effects results when 
including interaction terms between the competition variables and type of school (comparing 
column c of Table 1 to column d of Table 2). 
In summary then, it does not appear as though the original results for the competition 
variables, and in particular the apparent negative effect of competition from local voucher 
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schools on a school’s academic performance, are due to endogenous location choices of 
voucher reflecting characteristics of the local areas.  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The principal finding of this paper is that increased competition from the presence of 
more voucher schools in a local area is not associated with improved performance at other 
schools in the area, in terms of their pupils’ test scores. Indeed, the association is negative, 
suggesting average test scores fall in schools which face an increase in competition from 
voucher schools. On the other hand, an increase in the number of public schools in an area is 
associated with higher test scores in other schools in that area, so that beneficial competition 
effects are observed in such cases. 
Thus there do not appear to be any efficiency gains from introducing new private 
voucher schools, in terms of performance at other schools. Indeed, such performance in other, 
public, schools, appears to fall. What could be the explanation for such a finding? One 
possible explanation is that the observed effect is not a causal one, but rather simply reflects 
endogenous location choices of voucher schools, which may be set up in areas selected on the 
basis of unobserved characteristics that also influence public school performance. The 
negative correlation may also be due to reverse causality, with voucher schools established in 
certain areas because of the low performance in public schools. When we allow for such 
endogeneity, however, trying both an IV and a Fixed Effects specification, then the results 
are unaltered qualitatively, with a statistically significant negative coefficient on voucher 
school competition still observed. 
Having ruled out reverse causality and area unobserved heterogeneity stories, another 
possible explanation that remains is a sorting one, whereby better pupils leave public schools 
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to join voucher schools, therefore reducing average performance in public schools. We 
cannot offer proof that this is the causal mechanism behind our main result, since we do not 
observe transitions of pupils between schools, but we can offer some findings that are 
consistent with such an interpretation. First, if voucher schools are attracting higher attaining 
pupils from public schools, then we would expect to see that academic performance is higher 
on average in voucher schools. This is indeed what we observe, with the full regression 
results in Table C.1 in Appendix C showing that pupils in voucher schools score on average 
almost 14 points higher, after controlling for all the other determinants of performance. 
Second, if there are sorting effects such that some families are tempted to move their 
children to voucher schools as they become available, then we might expect that it is middle 
class parents who take advantage of such opportunities, given they are more likely to have the 
financial resources to pay relocation or travel costs as well as any additional fees required by 
voucher schools. Poorer families will not have such financial resources, while the richest 
families mostly send their children to private schools and are not influenced by voucher 
school availability. If the reason for the negative effects of voucher school competition are 
sorting effects, we might therefore expect to see larger such negative effects in schools with 
more middle class families. Again, this is exactly what we observe, which we investigated in 
two ways. First, the sample was divided into five according to the average socioeconomic 
status of families that attend each school, as given by the Ministry of Education and using the 
conglomerate technique,xvii using information on the education and monthly income of each 
household, and the vulnerability index of pupils. When the analysis was undertaken 
separately for each such socio-economic band (bands A to E, with A being the poorest) then 
the effect of competition from voucher schools is largest amongst the middle group, band C, 
with this being the only socio-economic band where the effect is statistically significant. 
Second, we ran a quantile regression, the results of which showed the negative effect of 
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competition from voucher schools to be statistically significant only in the middle of the 
conditional distribution (statistically significant at the median quantile but at neither the upper 
nor lower quantile).  
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), in attempting to explain the absence of competition 
effects from increased numbers of voucher schools in their area-level study discussed earlier, 
also came to the same conclusion that sorting effects are the likely explanation, after showing 
that the socio-economic status of public school pupils declined more in those areas where the 
number of voucher schools increased most. As stated above, such results as ours above and 
those of Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) do not prove that sorting is the causal mechanism, but 
they are consistent with a sorting story, and at least suggest that the sorting effect is worthy of 
further research, if suitable longitudinal data at the pupil can be sourced. 
In conclusion, the main finding of this research is that there is no evidence that 
voucher schools have produced positive competition effects on other schools in Chile, thus 
leaving doubts about whether or not a privatised market of education achieves all of its 
objectives. This is especially so considering that the benefits of competition could be enjoyed 
by implementing school choice without the need for implementing a strongly privatised 
educational system, such as the Chilean one. These results could be taken as an alert for other 
nations that want to implement similar educational reforms. Great care needs to be exercised 
when creating new voucher schools, to limit the impact of sorting effects, and the consequent 
increased inequality in educational outcomes. 
This does not mean that creating competition between public schools has no effect, 
however, and our results suggest that higher numbers of public schools in an area is 
associated with improved performance in schools in that area. Thus competition can lead to 
efficiency gains, within a purely public-provided system. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Competition Index Regressions – OLS Regression Results 
 
a:OLS 
Quantity 
3km 
b:OLS 
Quality 
3km 
c:OLS 
Quantity 
3km 
intera’ns 
d:OLS 
Quantity 
2km 
e:OLS 
Quantity 
4km 
f: OLS 
Quantity 
2km  
SNED 
Competition 
from public 
schools 
1.598**  
(0.625) 
0.203 
(0.387) 
1.450** 
(0.610) 
2.705** 
(1.216) 
1.024** 
(0.460 
1.576** 
(0.638) 
Competition 
from voucher 
schools 
-0.763** 
(0.377) 
-0.063 
(0.334) 
-0.761** 
(0.376) 
-1.290** 
(0.646) 
-0.485* 
(0.272) 
-0.845** 
(0.379) 
Competition 
from public 
schools * 
Voucher 
school  
 
  0.284* 
(0.149) 
   
Competition 
from voucher 
schools * 
Voucher 
school 
 
  -0.039 
(0.045) 
   
Number of 
observations 
2,909 1,755 2,909 2,909 2,909 2,909 
R2 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.659 0.658 0.660 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by municipality. 
Column titles report whether competition variables measures the quantity of competing 
schools or their quality, as well as the distance around each school within which competition 
is measured.  
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Table 2: Competition Index Regressions – IV and Fixed Effects Regression Results 
 
a:IV b:IV 
(Interact) 
c:Region 
Fixed 
Effects 
d:Region 
Fixed 
Effects 
(Interact) 
Competition from public schools 3.092** 
(1.449) 
 
3.024* 
(1.556) 
1.129** 
(0.550) 
1.015* 
(0.534) 
Competition from voucher schools -1.646* 
(0.916) 
-1.649* 
(0.951) 
-0.479* 
(0.257) 
-0.482* 
(0.253) 
 
Competition from public schools * 
Voucher school  
  0.328 
(0.260) 
 0.252* 
(0.144) 
 
Competition from voucher schools 
* Voucher school 
  -0.086 
(0.171) 
 -0.035 
(0.046) 
 
Number of observations 2,578 2,578 2,887 2,887 
R2 0.651 0.651 0.664 0.665 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by municipality. 
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Appendix A 
Table A.1: Data Sets, Variables and Years Included 
Source Variables Years 
SIMCE 2009, Ministry of Education Average academic test performance (SIMCE) by school 2009 
 http://www.simce.cl/ Average income of parents in schools 2009 
  Educational level of father by school 2009 
 
Educational level of mother by school 2009 
  Average income of households by school 2009 
  Socio-economic level of school 2009 
  Type of school 2009 
      
SIMCE 2005, Ministry of Education 
http://www.mineduc.cl/ 
Average Academic Test Performance (SIMCE) by School 2005 
 
    
Schools Directory, Ministry of Education Number of pupils by school 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/     
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Enrolment, Ministry of Education Number of teachers by school 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/  Teachers’ working hours by school 2009 
  Gender of pupils by school 2009 
      
Vulnerability Index, Ministry of Education Vulnerability index of schools 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/  Pupils’ socioeconomic groups  2009 
      
Voucher Registration, Ministry of Education Type of voucher school (fee or free) 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/ 
 
  
Vulnerable Children, Ministry of Education  Number of vulnerable children by school 2009 
http://www.mineduc.cl/ 
     
School Geographic Location, Ministry of Education, Chilean 
Government http://www.mineduc.cl/ 
(X,Y) coordinates of school 2009 
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CASEN 2006, Ministry of Development and Planning Poverty level by municipality 2006 
http://www.ministeriodesarrollosocial.gob.cl  
     
Municipality Indicators, Ministry of Housing and Urbanism Perception close to public transportation by municipality 2010 
http://www.observatoriourbano.cl/ indurb/seleccion.asp Perception of traffic jam level by municipality 2010 
  Books per capita by municipality 2001 
  Illiteracy level by municipality 2006 
  Water coverage by municipality 2006 
  Electricity coverage by municipality 2006 
 
Average schooling population by municipality 2006 
Municipality Information, SINIM: Municipality Information 
National System 
Education spending per capita by municipality 2006 
http://www.sinim.gov.cl/  
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Human Development Index by Municipality, UNDP & 
Ministry of Development  
Human development index by municipality 2003 
http://www.desarrollohumano.cl/ 
     
Census 2002, National Estadistics Institute) Number of indigenous people by municipality 2002 
http://www.ine.cl/  Number of Catholic people by municipality 2002 
  Population Density by municipality 2002 
  Population total of 5 to 14 years olds by municipality 2002 
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Appendix B: Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std dev Min Max 
Language score in 2009 by school 4,457 243.80 23.71 154 329 
Maths score in 2009 by school 4,457 248.95 25.64 180 340 
Language score in 2005 by school 4,386 249.59 25.28 150 329 
Maths score in 2005 by school 4,382 240.84 27.01 150 326 
Average SIMCE score in 2009 by school 4,457 246.37 23.82 175 334 
Average SIMCE score in 2005 by school 4,380 245.23 25.64 150 325 
% + perception of public transport by munic. 3125 85.10 7.54 43.20 99.00 
Weekly hours of teachers / pupil by school 4,457 1.73 0.70 0.31 7 
% fathers with university degree by school 4,355 4.95 9.17 0 100 
% mothers with university degree by school 4,355 4.04 7.69 0 100 
Average income of parents by school 4,355 283,954 189,536 50,000 1,631,429 
Fee by school 4,457 5,178 11,742 0 76,402 
Density (5 to 14 years old) per km2 by munic. 4,457 3,340 6,075 0 29,654 
Total population by municipality 4,457 121,110 115,789 507 492,915 
Population (5 to 14 years old) by municipality 4,473 21,749 21,777 8 102,760 
% poverty by municipality 4,455 14.79 6.69 0.60 51 
% Indigenous by municipality 4,457 5.49 9.43 0.18 78 
% Illiteracy by municipality 4,058 4.19 2.92 0.30 14.09 
Av. schooling population by munic. (years) 4,016 8.34 1.46 5.57 14 
Ed spending/capita (000s of Pesos) by munic. 4,415 74.21 37.93 9.39 297.84 
Number of churches by municipality 3,529 7.08 6.06 1.00 28.00 
% Catholics by municipality 4,457 70.71 9.53 23.04 96 
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Appendix C: Table C.1: Competition Index Regressions – Full Regression Results 
 
OLS  
Competition from public schools 1.598 (0.625) ** 
Competition from voucher schools -0.763 (0.377)** 
Perception transport coverage * Competition from public schools -0.018 (0.007)** 
Perception transport coverage* Competition from voucher schools 0.008 (0.004)* 
Voucher School 13.903 (2.014)*** 
Average test scores in 2005 0.559 (0.017)*** 
Voucher * aver. hours per pupil  -5.455 (1.119)*** 
Average hours per pupil 0.460 (0.712) 
% fathers with university degree 0.228 (0.089)** 
% mothers with university degree 0.240 (0.100)** 
Average income of parents 0.451 (0.517) 
Boys school 9.320 (2.328)*** 
Girls school 9.604 (1.287)*** 
Fee 0.043 (0.068) 
Density 5-14 year olds per km2 † -1.158 (6.071) 
% Poverty † -0.013 (0.072) 
% Indigenous † -0.040 (0.060) 
Books per capita 2001 † 0.222 (0.096)** 
% Illiterate 2006 † 0.869 (0.253)*** 
Av. years of schooling in pop † -0.022 (0.243) 
Education spending per capita † -6.894 (19.103) 
Constant  99.609 (4.532)*** 
Number of observations 2,909 
R2 0.659 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering by municipality. 
All variables measured at the school level except those indicated by †, which are measured at 
the municipality level. 
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Appendix D: Table D.1: First Stage Estimation (IV). Dependent Variable: Competition 
from Voucher Schools 
  Coef (se) 
Number of Catholic Churches † 0.256 (0.109)** 
Competition from public schools  1.012 (0.153)*** 
Average test scores in 2005  0.030 (0.010)*** 
Average hours per pupil -0.546 (0.513) 
Voucher school 0.698 (1.589) 
Voucher * average hours per pupil -0.637 (0.639) 
% Fathers with university degree -0.070 (0.062) 
%_Mothers with university degree 0.019 (0.035) 
Average income of parents -0.308 (0.333) 
Boys school 1.000 (1.620) 
Girls school 0.977 (1.261) 
Fee -0.002 (0.029) 
Density 5-14 year olds per km2 † 47.062 (11.636)*** 
% Poverty † -0.134 (0.093) 
% Indigenous † -0.000 (0.094) 
Education spending per capita † -77.556 (21.491)*** 
Books per capita 2001 † 0.169 (0.149) 
% Illiterate 2006 † -0.386 (0.188)** 
Average years of schooling in pop † 0.004 (0.391) 
Constant 6.690 (3.818)* 
Number of observations 3,092 
R2 0.586 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering 
by municipality. All variables measured at the school level except those indicated by †, which 
are measured at the municipality level. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Average Pupil Performance in 2005 and 2009 by School (Mathematics 
& Language) 
 
 
 
i Public schools were also allowed to top up their public funding but only at the level of secondary education. 
ii Although scores on the PISA test have been improving since the early 2000s, Chile still scores the lowest of all 
35 OECD countries, with the exception of Mexico and Turkey (OECD, 2015). 
iii In more recent years, English and physical education have also been added. 
iv For this research, private schools are dropped from the analysis, since they were never part of the voucher reform 
and tuition is fully paid by families, with almost no control from the government. 
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v Alternatives to using such an output measure (pupil performance) as an indicator of quality of education 
provision, are input measures such as class size, expenditures, or measures of teachers’ skills (Hanushek, 1986). 
We prefer to use the output measure as capturing the effects of all inputs, rather than focus on a specific input. 
vi The distance was selected using the average distance that pupils travel from their residence to their school 
presented by Chumancero, et al. (2009). 
vii Information on which schools received a SNED premium is available at: 
http://datos.mineduc.cl/dataviews/235866/VISTA-SNED-2004-2005/  
viii The proportion of voucher schools within regions with catholic links varies in 2016 between around 30% and 
50%, with an average value across regions. Source: Ministry of Education (2017). 
ix http://www.tourismchile.com/themes/churches_of_chile/articles/638 
 http://www.chilecontact.com/en/sugerencia/churchesChapels.php 
xhttp://www.cncr.cl/611/articles-50335_archivo_6.pdf 
xi Any level of improvement has been considered. 
xii For example, the Metropolitan Region public transportation service has experienced a thorough modernisation 
and expansion in its coverage, since the ‘TranSantiago’ plan was first implemented in 2005. However, massive 
chaos was faced by commuters and the new system was largely rejected by popular opinion. 
xiii The same is observed when the SNED variables are entered separately. Note that the school level SNED 
indicator attracts a positive and significant coefficient, while the variable measuring the proportion of schools in 
the municipality in receipt of SNED has an insignificant effect. 
xiv See Table D.1 in Appendix D. 
xv F(19,148)=36.21, Prob>F=0.000 
xvi The first stage was estimated manually because the instrumented competition variable was interacted with other 
variables in the second stage regression (column b). Without using bootstrapping (300 iterations) the standard 
errors in the second stage would be wrong (Wooldridge, 2002).  
xvii In this way, a school’s characteristics within the same group are similar and different to a school’s 
characteristics in other groups.  
